


THE 2014 VALUE CREATORS REPORT

TURNAROUND


TRANSFORMING VALUE CREATION



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THE 2014 VALUE CREATORS REPORT
TURNAROUND

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PREFACE

TURNAROUND: *TRANSFORMING VALUE CREATION* is the sixteenth annual report in the Value Creators series published by The Boston Consulting Group. Each year, we offer commentary on trends in the global economy and the world's capital markets, share BCG's latest research and thinking on value creation, describe our experiences working with clients to improve their value-creation performance, and publish detailed empirical rankings of the performance of the world's top value creators.

This year's report focuses on a specific type of value creation success—what we call a TSR turnaround, in which a company with a recent history of below-average value creation was able to transform its trajectory and deliver superior value during the period of our study. We begin by analyzing the results of this year's top-performer rankings in light of the unusual starting period of this year's study—the immediate aftermath of the 2008 market downturn. Next, we describe some recent research on TSR-turnaround companies and explain why they are overrepresented in our top-ten rankings. We follow with a detailed case study of how one of these companies and a BCG client, Seagate Technology, achieved such a turnaround—with an emphasis on the practical priorities and tools for making it happen. We conclude with our annual rankings of the top ten value creators worldwide and in 26 industries for the five-year period from 2009 through 2013.

FIVE YEARS OF PLENTY

WHAT A DIFFERENCE FIVE years make. In 2009, global equity markets were coming off the biggest decline in valuations since the Great Depression. Five years later, the companies in BCG's Value Creators database delivered double-digit average annual total shareholder return (TSR) for the five-year period from 2009 through 2013.

Some readers may think that these strong returns are an artifact of the particular period covered by this year's report. In other words, given that the market declined so much previous to this period, it is to be expected that returns would be especially healthy from such a depressed starting point.

That's true—but only up to a point. When it comes to the period's top performers, the story is more complicated—and more hopeful for any company that has experienced a period of below-average shareholder value. But before turning to the complications, let's review broadly the basic results.

The World's Top Value Creators

Just how good was the performance of the companies in the Value Creators database over the last five years? The average annual TSR for the 1,620 companies in this year's sample was approximately 20 percent. The average annual TSR for the 26 industry sectors ranged from a low of 9 percent (in power

and gas utilities) to a high of 35 percent (in fashion and luxury)—and all but one industry delivered double-digit average annual TSR. (See Exhibit 1.)


The average annual TSR for the companies in this year's sample was 20 percent.

The leading companies in our sample, however, substantially outpaced not only their own industry average but also the total sample average. The average TSR of the top ten companies in each industry beat their industry averages by anywhere from 12 percentage points (in power and gas utilities) to 51 percentage points (in travel and tourism). The lesson for executives is this: being in a sector with below-average market performance is no excuse. No matter how bad an industry's average performance is relative to other sectors and to the market as a whole, it is still possible for companies in that industry to deliver superior shareholder returns.

What kind of TSR was necessary to achieve truly superior performance, given the sample average? A company had to deliver an average annual TSR of at least 31 percent to be in

EXHIBIT 1 | All but One Industry in Our Sample Delivered Double-Digit Average Annual TSR

Average annual TSR, 2009–2013 (%)



Sources: S&P Capital IQ; company disclosures; BCG analysis.

the top quartile of the global sample; between 18.6 percent and 56.4 percent, depending on the industry, to make it into the industry top ten; and at least 94.6 percent to make the global top ten. The most successful companies, seven out of the global top ten, delivered triple-digit average annual returns. And this year's top value creator—for the second year in a row, the U.S. biopharma company Pharmacyclics—had an average annual TSR greater than 165 percent. (See the left-hand list in Exhibit 2.)

To put these results into perspective, this is the best performance of the top ten global companies in the 16 years we have been publishing the Value Creators report. The only two five-year periods in which the global top ten came close to generating equally high TSR were 1995-1999, at the height of the Internet bubble, and 2003-2007, when the market

reached its peak before the 2008 financial crisis.

Unlike recent years, when companies from emerging markets dominated our global top ten, developed countries win the prize this year, with seven of the ten coming from the U.S., France, Japan, Ireland, and Sweden. When it comes to the world's largest companies, six of the top ten are located in the U.S.—and a seventh, the Chinese Internet-search provider Baidu, is listed on a U.S. stock market. Leading U.S. large-cap value creators include Priceline.com and Las Vegas Sands, at number one and number two, respectively; retailers Starbucks and Amazon.com at numbers six and seven, auto company Ford Motor at number eight, and Apple (by far, the company with the biggest market valuation on our list) at number nine. (See the right-hand list in Exhibit 2.)

EXHIBIT 2 | Companies from Developed Countries Dominated the Global and Large-Cap Top Ten

Global top 10

| | Company | Location | Industry | TSR ¹ (%) | Market value ² (\$billions) |
|----|-----------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1 | Pharmacyclics | United States | Biopharma | 166.3 | 7.8 |
| 2 | GungHo Online Entertainment | Japan | Consumer durables | 138.5 | 8.3 |
| 3 | Galaxy Entertainment | Hong Kong | Travel and tourism | 130.9 | 37.9 |
| 4 | Jazz Pharmaceuticals | Ireland | Biopharma | 130.9 | 7.3 |
| 5 | Avis Budget | United States | Travel and tourism | 125.1 | 4.3 |
| 6 | Great Wall Motors | China | Automotive OEMs | 109.0 | 16.8 |
| 7 | Hexpol | Sweden | Chemicals | 101.3 | 2.6 |
| 8 | Sirius XM Radio | United States | Media and publishing | 96.9 | 21.4 |
| 9 | Plastic Omnium | France | Automotive components | 95.6 | 4.1 |
| 10 | Brilliance China Automotive | Hong Kong | Automotive OEMs | 94.6 | 8.2 |

Large-cap top 10

| | Company | Location | Industry | TSR ¹ (%) | Market value ² (\$billions) |
|----|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| 1 | Priceline.com | United States | Travel and tourism | 73.6 | 59.8 |
| 2 | Las Vegas Sands | United States | Travel and tourism | 71.4 | 64.5 |
| 3 | Baidu | United States | Media and publishing | 68.6 | 62.2 |
| 4 | Tencent | Hong Kong | Media and publishing | 58.7 | 117.6 |
| 5 | Tata Consultancy Services | India | Technology | 58.4 | 68.8 |
| 6 | Starbucks | United States | Retail | 54.4 | 59.1 |
| 7 | Amazon.com | United States | Retail | 50.7 | 182.5 |
| 8 | Ford Motor | United States | Automotive OEMs | 47.8 | 60.8 |
| 9 | Apple | United States | Technology | 46.7 | 500.7 |
| 10 | Volkswagen (preferred) | Germany | Automotive OEMs | 43.7 | 130.8 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: For the global top ten, n = 1,620 global companies; for the large-cap top ten, n = 164 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$50 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Average annual total shareholder return, 2009–2013.

²As of December 31, 2013.

TSR Turnaround

Because the holding period of this year's report starts in 2009, it's important to ask, How much of the value creation performance of this year's top value creators is due to these companies having been especially hard hit by the 2008 downturn, rather than to anything that they have done in the period since?

Companies in our top-ten industry rankings lost 55 percent of their value in 2008.


Exhibit 3 compares the performance of the 260 companies in our industry top-ten rankings with that of the roughly 35,000 companies in the MSCI All Country World Index. To capture the impact of the 2008 downturn, we created a TSR index in which the end of 2007 equals 100. As the exhibit shows, the MSCI index lost about 40 percent of its value in 2008. But the companies in our

top-ten industry rankings lost even more—about 55 percent. In other words, at the beginning of the five-year holding period analyzed this year, the valuations of these companies were more depressed than the valuation of the average company.

During the five-year holding period, the MSCI index went on to deliver approximately 15 percent annual average TSR. In contrast, our top-ten companies delivered about 42 percent—nearly three times as much. Of that 42 percent, we estimate that about 8 percentage points were the result of those companies' lower starting point in 2008.

Put another way, about a fifth of the shareholder value that these companies generated during the five-year holding period was a function of their depressed starting point. The rest, however, was due to superior performance. One dramatic sign of this superior performance: whereas it took the MSCI index a full four years to win back the value destroyed in 2008, our industry top-ten companies had nearly done so by the end of 2009.

EXHIBIT 3 | Since 2008, the Top Value Creators Delivered TSR Nearly Triple the Global Market Average



Sources: S&P Capital IQ; BCG analysis.
¹MSCI All Country World Index.

So although these companies benefited from an outsized market rebound, they obviously did a lot more than simply rise with the market. In fact, many of them achieved a comprehensive *TSR turnaround*. After an extended period of below-average value creation, they found a way to fundamentally

transform their historical TSR trajectory and deliver superior value during the period of our study. To explore this phenomenon further, we decided to do some additional research this year to focus on the TSR-turnaround companies in our rankings.

THE DYNAMICS OF TSR TURNAROUNDS

TSR TURNAROUNDS ARE COMPANIES that deliver superior value creation after an extended period of below-average TSR performance and a below-average valuation multiple. It turns out that companies with this starting position not only deliver more TSR, on average, than the other companies in our sample. They are also overrepresented in our industry top-ten rankings.

The Importance of Starting Point

To analyze the dynamics of TSR turnarounds, we took a look back to the TSR performance of the companies in this year's Value Creators database during the previous five-year period from 2004 through 2008. First, we divided the companies into two groups: those that delivered TSR below their industry average during that period and those that delivered TSR above their industry average. Because not all companies in this year's sample were public companies during that earlier period (either because they did not yet exist or were held privately), we were able to do this analysis for 1,330 out of the total 1,620 companies in our sample.

Next, we categorized these companies according to whether their valuation multiple (measured as the ratio of enterprise value to EBITDA) was either above or below the average valuation multiple for their industry at the end of 2008 (the end of the previous five-year


period and the beginning of the five-year time frame of this year's Value Creators report). This metric gives a sense of how investors were valuing the companies' likely future performance at the time.

TSR turnarounds deliver superior value after a period of below-average TSR.

The result of this segmentation is the four-box matrix on the left in Exhibit 4. Note that the number of companies is largest in the lower-left quadrant (that is, those companies with below-industry-average TSR and below-industry-average multiples) and the upper-right quadrant (those with above-industry-average TSR and multiples). That outcome reflects the fact that change in a company's valuation multiple (whether positive or negative) is an integral part of the calculation of TSR. (See the sidebar "The Components of TSR.")

What is striking, however, is the way these different starting points affected the future performance of the companies in our sample. Having segmented the companies into the four groups shown in the matrix, we then calculated the average TSR performance of

EXHIBIT 4 | Companies That Performed Poorly in 2004-2008 Delivered the Highest Relative TSR in 2009-2013



Source: BCG analysis.

Note: The total sample consists of the 1,330 companies that have ten-year (2004-2013) TSR data out of the 1,620 companies in the 2014 Value Creators database.

these four groups in 2009-2013, relative to their industry average. The results of this analysis can be seen in the matrix on the right in Exhibit 4.

Those companies that in the previous five-year period had both a below-industry-average TSR and a below-industry-average 2008 multiple performed significantly better than the rest, delivering TSR that was nearly 5 percentage points above their industry average. Meanwhile, those companies with above-industry-average TSR in the previous five-year period and above-industry-average multiples did poorest, delivering TSR that was nearly 2 percentage points less than the industry average.

What about the top-performing companies in this year's Value Creators database? We repeated the same analyses for the 180 companies that had ten-year TSR data out of the 260 in our industry top-ten rankings. As the matrix on the left in Exhibit 5 illustrates, companies with previously poor TSR performance and a low 2008 multiple are substantially overrepresented in the top-ten rankings for 2009-2013. Seventy-five out of 369 companies in this category—or 20.3 percent—are in the industry top-ten rankings. These are the

companies that we are calling TSR turn-arounds. In contrast, only 31 out of 397 companies with previously high TSR performance and a high 2008 multiple made it into one of the top-ten rankings for 2009-2013—roughly 8 percent. Put simply, a company with previously poor performance and a low 2008 multiple had a 1 in 5 chance of making it into one of this year's top-ten rankings, whereas a company with previously superior performance and a high 2008 multiple had less than a 1 in 12 chance.

Of the companies in our top-ten rankings, those in all four quadrants delivered TSR that was substantially higher than the industry average. (See the matrix on the right in Exhibit 5.) Nevertheless, the TSR-turnaround companies, in the lower-left quadrant, delivered about 4.5 percentage points more relative TSR, on average, than the companies in the other three quadrants.

This data clearly illustrates an important fact about the dynamics of TSR: a company's starting point matters enormously. Just because a company has been performing poorly doesn't mean it can't become a top performer. Indeed, in some respects, it is especially well positioned to do so. And just because a


THE COMPONENTS OF TSR

TSR is the product of multiple factors. Regular readers of the Value Creators report should be familiar with BCG's model for quantifying the relative contribution of TSR's various sources. (See the exhibit below.) The model uses the combination of revenue (sales) growth and change in margins as an indicator of a company's improvement in fundamental value. It then uses the change in the company's valuation multiple to determine the impact of investor expectations on TSR. Together, these two factors determine the change in a company's market capitalization and the capital gain (or loss) to investors. Finally, the model tracks the distribution of free cash flow to investors and debt holders in the form of dividends, share repurchases,

and repayments of debt to determine the contribution of free-cash-flow payouts to a company's TSR.


The important thing to remember is that all these factors interact with one another—sometimes in unexpected ways. A company may grow its revenue through an EPS-accretive acquisition and yet not create any TSR, because the new acquisition has the effect of eroding gross margins. And some forms of cash contribution (for example, dividends) have a more positive impact on a company's valuation multiple than others (for example, share buybacks). Because of these interactions, we recommend that companies take a holistic approach to value creation strategy.

TSR Is the Product of Multiple Factors



Source: BCG analysis.

EXHIBIT 5 | TSR-Turnaround Companies Are Overrepresented in the Top-Ten Rankings



Source: BCG analysis.

Note: The industry top ten consists of the 180 companies that have ten-year (2004-2013) TSR data out of the 260 companies in our industry top-ten rankings.

company has a history of superior TSR performance, that does not mean its senior executives should be complacent. It's not merely that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Previous superior TSR performance can actually become an obstacle to maintaining superior TSR performance because the expectation of high performance is already priced into the stock price in the form of a high valuation multiple, and delivering superior TSR is all about beating expectations, not just meeting them.

How TSR-Turnaround Companies Create Value

Of course, just because a company has a period of poor TSR performance does not automatically mean that it will become a top performer later on. Bringing about a TSR turnaround depends on making a series of moves that fundamentally redirect a company's TSR trajectory. Although each company's story is different, we found some common patterns in the way that the TSR-turnaround companies in our sample reversed their fortunes.

- *A Return to Fiscal Discipline.* The starting point for many TSR turnarounds is getting the balance sheet in order by paying down debt, controlling costs, and improving free

cash flow. This was especially the case in the period immediately after the financial crisis, when the paucity of available credit forced companies to become far more disciplined in their use of cash.

The starting point for many TSR turnarounds is getting the balance sheet in order.

- *Focus on Margin Expansion over Growth.* Similarly, in the trade-off between growth and margins, these companies tend to rely less on earnings growth than other top performers and more on margin improvement to deliver TSR. Whereas revenue growth was responsible for 5 percentage points of TSR at our TSR-turnaround companies, it was responsible for 14 percentage points of TSR at other top performers. That's not to say, however, that finding new sources of quality earnings isn't often a key part of the TSR-turnaround formula for many companies.
- *Growing the Dividend.* In many situations, substantial dividend increases were part

of the value creation strategy at TSR-turnaround companies. As their cash position improved, they increased their dividend both as a direct contribution to TSR and as a signal to the market of management confidence in the company's prospects.

- Benefiting from an Improving Multiple.* All the companies in our top-ten rankings benefited from a greatly improved valuation multiple. But the TSR-turnaround companies benefited a lot more—as one would expect, given that their performance was beating the relatively low expectations that investors had at the beginning of the 2009-2013 period. Whereas multiple improvement accounted for 14 percentage points of TSR at the nonturnaround companies in our sample, it accounted for 22 percentage points at the TSR-turnaround companies.


Alfa: Profile of a TSR Turnaround

One company in our top-ten rankings whose value creation performance follows the

pattern of a TSR turnaround is the Mexican conglomerate Alfa, the number one company in the multibusiness top ten, with an average annual TSR of 68.9 percent in the 2009-2013 period. Exhibit 6 tracks Alfa's TSR for the ten years from 2004 through 2013 against the performance of both the leading Mexican market index and the MSCI All Country World Index. The exhibit shows that, starting in early 2006, Alfa's TSR began to lag the Mexican market average—a lag that was exacerbated by the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Since then, however, the company's TSR has achieved a remarkable comeback, outpacing the Mexican market average considerably.

What explains Alfa's turnaround? The company's origins go back to 1974, when it began as a Mexican family-owned conglomerate. With a core business in the steel industry, the company made a series of unrelated acquisitions until, by the late 1970s, Alfa was operating in nine sectors of the Mexican economy, including steel, paper and packaging, synthetic fiber, electronics, real

EXHIBIT 6 | Alfa Has Gone from Trailing to Surpassing the Mexican Market



Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; BCG analysis.

¹Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC).

²MSCI All Country World Index.

estate and tourism, petrochemicals, mining, and communications.

Alfa almost went bankrupt during the Mexican financial crisis of 1982, an experience that led to two waves of major portfolio transformation. The first, which was completed in the early 1990s, focused the company on four main sectors—steel, petrochemicals, food, and a small collection of diverse businesses. The second, which took place in the early years of the new century, caused Alfa to focus even more on those businesses with the greatest prospects for growth and profitability.

In 2004, the company sold off part of its legacy steel business, and it fully exited the business in 2005. In 2006, it started a joint venture with Pioneer Natural Resources to explore for natural gas in Texas. By 2008, Alfa's portfolio had been completely transformed; none of the company's original businesses remained. It had also shifted from being primarily in the Mexican domestic market to having a much more international presence.

This transformation, however, didn't prevent Alfa from being hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis. Its automotive-components business was seriously threatened by the possible bankruptcy of GM. And major exposure in the market for financial derivatives caused the company to lose roughly \$1 billion in market capitalization as its equity value declined by a massive 75 percent. Nevertheless, Alfa was well positioned to take advantage of the postdownturn rebound. The solid positioning of its businesses and the measures it took to address new market conditions (for example, taking advantage of cheaper debt) allowed the company to report its best year ever in 2009, ending the year with a leaner cost structure and a stronger financial condition.

Today, Alfa is the world's largest independent producer of aluminum-casted engine components for the automotive industry and one of the world's largest producers of polyester (PTA, PET, and fibers). It is the leading maker of processed meats in North America, as well as a leading company in IT and communications services for the business segment in

Mexico. Finally, its early investment in the U.S. natural-gas business positioned Alfa to take advantage of recent moves to deregulate the Mexican energy industry. With an estimated \$16 billion in 2013 revenue, the company has become the third-largest industrial group in Mexico. In the five-year period of our study, it nearly doubled its earnings from \$8.5 billion in 2009, a compound annual growth rate of 14 percent, and its cash flow grew by 11 percent per year, from \$1.1 billion to \$1.9 billion.

Poor TSR performers should never give up on the goal of delivering superior TSR.

In short, Alfa made some tough decisions (exiting its legacy business), refocused its portfolio on those businesses with the greatest TSR potential, used the 2008 crisis to fix its balance sheet, and took some sensible strategic risks to enter new markets (such as natural gas). The result was a stellar five-year TSR performance. But Alfa's management can't rest on its laurels. The question today is whether the company's portfolio is well positioned for the future. And the challenge for Alfa's management will be to come up with a value creation strategy that will allow it to beat expectations once again in order to continue to deliver superior TSR.

Four Simple Lessons

Four simple lessons emerge from this analysis:

- *Successful value creators cannot afford to be complacent.* The higher their past TSR and the higher their valuation multiple, the more insightful and disciplined about value creation strategy they will have to be in order to maintain their superior performance.
- *Poor TSR performers should never give up on the goal of delivering superior TSR.* Indeed, they have the best odds of being a superior value creator in the future—but

only if they make the tough choices to improve both their fundamental performance and their valuation multiple relative to their industry and their peers. (See the sidebar “Gannett: A TSR Turnaround in the Making.”)

- *Know what factors drive your valuation.* In whatever quadrant on our matrix a


company finds itself, it pays to know the factors that drive its valuation multiple relative to its peers. In some situations, the multiple is directly linked to fundamental factors such as growth or margins. In others, it is linked to less tangible factors, such as the patterns of a company’s capital deployment, the nature of the risks it has taken on, or the transparency

GANNETT A TSR Turnaround in the Making

For an example of a company that has recently transformed its value-creation trajectory, consider the U.S. media company Gannett, perhaps best known as the publisher of *USA Today*. Since announcing a new business and financial strategy in March 2012, the company has tripled its share price and been one of the top value creators in the S&P 500, powerful signs that it is a TSR turnaround in the making. (See the exhibit below.)

Gannett has a broad portfolio of digital, mobile, broadcast, and print properties. But like many media companies with roots in the newspaper business, it has had to grapple with both the reality and the perception of a secular decline in print-based readership and advertising. Since 2008, the decline in revenues of the company’s publishing segment has created an overhang on value creation—as it has for all media companies with newspaper

Since 2012, Gannett Has Been a TSR Turnaround in the Making



Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; BCG analysis.
¹MSCI All Country World Index.

and credibility of its value-creation strategy. In our experience, roughly 80 percent of the factors that drive differences in valuation multiples among similar companies can be identified and managed.

- *Develop a comprehensive value-creation strategy.* Every company needs to have a

value creation strategy that addresses all the factors that contribute to TSR. The relative importance of earnings growth, margins, dividends, share buybacks, and the like will depend on a company's starting position. And business strategy, financial strategy, and investor strategy have to be integrated and aligned.

assets. As recently as 2011, Gannett was trading at less than its breakup value. In effect, investors were valuing the company as if it had no future cash flows from its newspaper businesses.

Gannett CFO Gracia Martore (who became the company's CEO in October 2011) and the rest of the Gannett leadership team developed a multipronged strategy to transform the business, expand margins, and boost revenue growth. The transformation included a series of actions to stabilize the newspaper business and create related adjacent businesses, to rebalance the overall portfolio of businesses through acquisition of additional broadcast-TV stations, and to leverage the company's strong cash flow in order to directly raise TSR through a substantial increase in the company's dividend and share buybacks. The new strategy, including a 150 percent increase in Gannett's dividend, was officially unveiled at the company's first-ever investor day in March 2012.

Since then, Gannett has executed a broad range of successful strategic and operational moves. The company has redesigned its subscription-pricing model, which has led to circulation revenue increases. It has also consolidated all of its printing and distribution operations into a single entity, allowing it to take advantage of scale efficiencies. At the same time, it has launched a new local-marketing and services business, aimed at helping local advertisers plan and execute integrated traditional-media and digital-marketing campaigns, and created

new content services, such as USA Sports Media and a travel media group. In 2013, Gannett announced the \$2.2 billion acquisition of the Belo broadcasting group, making Gannett the largest independent TV-station group of major network affiliates in the top 25 U.S. markets. And in 2014, the company rolled out a major change in its largest community newspapers, integrating content from *USA Today* as a separate section, which both extends *USA Today's* reach and frees up editorial and reporting capacity to reinvest in local news coverage.

These changes have had a strong and immediate impact on Gannett's performance. In 2012, the company posted its first year-over-year revenue growth since 2006. Meanwhile, it has continued to return significant cash to shareholders. The company estimates that, by 2015, it will have returned approximately \$1.3 billion to investors in the form of dividends and share buybacks since the launch of the new strategy. In little more than two years, from the development of the new strategy in October 2011 through the end of 2013, Gannett delivered an exceptional average annual TSR of 71 percent, making it one of the top ten value creators in the S&P 500.

SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY

ORCHESTRATING A TSR TURNAROUND


DISK DRIVE DESIGNER AND manufacturer Seagate Technology is the number two company in our global technology rankings. In the five years from 2009 through 2013, the company had an average annual TSR of 70.3 percent. Seagate's consistent focus on the impact of its business and financial decisions on TSR helped the company and its senior executives navigate an extremely turbulent business environment, while still delivering industry-leading TSR. (See Exhibit

7.) How it did so is also a classic case study of how to orchestrate a TSR turnaround.

A Changing Industry

Founded in 1979 by five technology entrepreneurs and executives who had played a key role in the early development of hard-disk drives, Seagate is a first-generation Silicon Valley company. By the end of the last century, it was the global leader in disk

EXHIBIT 7 | Seagate Exhibits the Classic Profile of a TSR Turnaround



Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; BCG analysis.
¹MSCI All Country World Index.

drives. In 1999, the company, led by then-CEO Steve Luczo, went private in a highly successful leveraged buyout, and it went public again at the end of 2002. Shortly after, Luczo stepped down as CEO to become board chairman.

By 2007, however, Seagate faced a challenging situation. In its early years, the disk drive industry, like many high-tech businesses, featured a combination of characteristics that fed rapid growth: high demand driven by the rapid expansion in computing and storage, regular technology advances (in particular, growth in so-called aerial density, or the amount of data that can be packed onto a drive), and a highly fragmented customer base and competitor set.

“We had to explain to customers and investors how we could survive another day.”

By the turn of the new century, all that was changing. The sector was consolidating, with fewer players and fewer and bigger customers. Innovation was slowing down and product cycles were getting longer. Meanwhile, new and potentially disruptive technologies, such as solid-state drives, were entering the data storage space. All these developments were leading investors to view the traditional disk-drive business as a risky investment with an uncertain future, putting downward pressure on valuations. Seagate was trading at a low multiple of roughly two to four times earnings.

What’s more, the strategy the company had pursued to address some of these changes in the market landscape wasn’t working. In an effort to expand its product portfolio and target new growth opportunities, the company had reorganized into market-facing business units. But at the same time, it began to fall behind in technology development in its core disk-drive business. Both margins and market share were declining, and the company’s estimates for future profits were moving into the red.

Senior executives were convinced that new business trends, such as cloud computing, would continue to drive further growth in the disk drive market. But it would require major new investments in core technology to improve the company’s competitive position. By 2008, those investments were well under way, but without much positive impact on the company’s stock price.

A Struggle for Survival

Then, as if refreshing the company’s technology platform weren’t challenge enough, Seagate—like many companies—was buffeted in 2008 and 2009 by a once-in-a-lifetime event: the global financial crisis and subsequent downturn. The company was highly leveraged, and the slowdown put it at risk of default. “We had a serious covenants issue,” recalls Pat O’Malley, who became Seagate’s CFO in August 2008. “We were trying to prevent a capital call. It was about whether we could live to survive another day, and we had to explain to our customers and investors how we would achieve this.” The immediate crisis led Seagate’s board to reappoint Luczo as the company’s CEO in January 2009.

Luczo and O’Malley quickly went about shoring up the company’s weak balance sheet. They took significant cost out of operations. They suspended the company’s relatively small dividend. They restructured its loans, agreeing to pay a higher interest rate in order to ease some of the most onerous loan covenants. And they reorganized, shifting from the business unit structure back to the company’s original functional structure, in order to refocus on execution and innovation in the core business.

Leveraging the Balance Sheet

These initial moves secured Seagate’s survival in the darkest days of the postcrisis downturn. The combination of major cost cutting and a refocus on technology in the core caused Seagate’s gross margins to grow nearly fourfold, from a low point of 7.5 percent in April 2009 to 27 percent by the end of the year, greatly improving its cash flow. But executives had little room for maneuver. Despite the delivery of \$3.19 per share earnings

in 2010 (after a loss in 2009) and the institution of an aggressive stock-buyback program, the company's stock actually lost much of the gains it had clawed back the previous year. The banks that held the company's debt had a large say in what the company could do, limiting its strategic options. For a time, Seagate's executives even considered going private again to escape the constraints of the public capital markets but were ultimately unable to complete the deal.

As the senior team at Seagate explored its options, Luczo and O'Malley began to realize that the company's greatly strengthened balance sheet and healthy cash flows could themselves be a resource in both improving the company's valuation and contributing to its TSR. The transition in the industry had fundamentally changed Seagate's profile and value proposition for investors. True, the industry was maturing, affecting growth rates and making Seagate less attractive to investors looking for rapid growth and outsized returns. But the company's strong cash flows would be appealing to another group of investors—so-called growth at reasonable price, or GARP, investors. The challenge was to attract greater numbers of these investors to the company's stock.

The new dividend increased Seagate's stock price by nearly 25 percent.

Seagate's senior team worked with BCG to evaluate the most effective way to accomplish this. The company's executives concluded that the best approach would be to reintroduce a significant dividend and raise it over time in order to combat the perception of uncertainty and risk in the business. BCG research showed that dividend increases typically have a much stronger positive impact on a company's valuation multiple than stock buybacks do. In the short term, initiating a dramatic dividend would boost the company's valuation, as investors arbitrated its high initial yield back to normal levels. In the long term, a large, consistent, and growing divi-

dent would attract the GARP investors that were the natural long-term investor base for a company like Seagate in a mature and consolidating sector. And as hedge funds and other short sellers exited the stock, Seagate's valuation would ultimately become less volatile as well.

It's important to emphasize how counterintuitive such an approach was for companies in the technology sector at that time. Focusing almost exclusively on cash flow and the profit and loss statement is the "story of the Valley," according to Luzco. Although things have changed somewhat since then, it was the rare tech company that creatively used its balance sheet for anything other than reinvestment in R&D or M&A to generate TSR, or that had even a minor dividend. But the work that Seagate had done to build up its balance sheet gave it a new resource with which to create value. "We began using our balance sheet as a weapon or a tool," says O'Malley.


In early April 2011, Seagate announced that starting in June 2011, it would be paying out an annual dividend of 86 cents per share, which created an initial dividend yield on the date of announcement of 5.4 percent. The move had an immediate impact on the company's stock price, as Seagate's high yield attracted many more investors to the stock. In the first two weeks after the dividend announcement, Seagate's stock price increased by nearly 25 percent (at a time when average gains in the S&P 500 were stagnant), as investors arbitrated the yield down to 4.4 percent. (See Exhibit 8.)

Parallel to the announcement was a major shift in the types of investors that senior executives talked to and the messages they tried to deliver. "We realized we had been talking to the wrong people and telling the wrong story," says O'Malley. The combination of the dividend announcement and the new focus on GARP investors began to pay off. For example, Capital Research and Management, the largest family of GARP funds in the U.S., with more than \$1 trillion in capital under management, had not owned Seagate shares before the dividend announcement. But afterwards, Capital Research became an important investor in Seagate's stock.

EXHIBIT 8 | Seagate's 2011 Dividend Announcement Created \$1.6 Billion in Additional Market Capitalization

The announcement improved Seagate's valuation ...

... as analysts strongly supported the dividend decision



"While the quarterly preannouncement was positive, we believe the dividend announcement was more important, as it signifies comfort with the cash flow of [Seagate] and provides an impressive yield of 5 percent."

—Richard Kugele, Needham & Co.

"Investors may find the volatility of the sector much more tolerable given the cushion that the dividend provides."

—Joe Yoo, Citi Investment Research

"... [Seagate's] deep analysis... made it recognize potential for a much more aggressive capital and payout structure that has since prompted both its \$2 billion stock buyback... and now this dividend."

—Robert Cihra, Caris & Co

"Seagate's decision to pursue the share buyback and meaningful dividend payment is a good sign for investors drawn to the stock's main strength, its cheap valuation."

—Seekingalpha.com

Source: BCG analysis.

Since then, the company has continued to increase its dividend to the point that, in 2014, it will pay out \$1.72 per share, double the dividend it launched in 2011. At the same time, Seagate has completed several large and moderate-sized acquisitions and continued to invest heavily in core technologies. By the end of 2013, these combined moves helped increase Seagate's price-to-earnings multiple to 11.

The TSR Lens

The focus on TSR has proven to be an effective vehicle for navigating the disruptions of the past five years. For example, it helped Seagate in 2012, when torrential floods in Thailand—where the vast majority of disk drives are assembled—wiped out a significant part of the industry's supply. Because its balance sheet was so healthy, the company was able to use the crisis to strike long-term agreements with its chief customers, which

had the effect of boosting margins for more than a year rather than just for a quarter or two. Once again, the company was able to leverage its strong balance sheet to moderate potential volatility.

The TSR lens has also led the company's senior executives to reinvent their mind-set about the business and how best to drive value. "We were forced to take a TSR perspective," says O'Malley. "In 2009, our balance sheet was the albatross around our neck. Now, it's a phoenix. We are focused on how we can use this balance sheet to do what we need to do. Today, we look at everything on that balance sheet as a potential source of TSR. We are determined to be good stewards of capital."

Take the example of M&A. M&A is a critical tool in the consolidating and evolving hard-disk industry. In 2011, for example, Seagate acquired Samsung's hard-drive business in an

acquisition valued at \$1.4 billion. M&A is also an important vehicle for entering new areas of future growth in adjacent businesses—as illustrated by the company’s December 2013 announcement that it was acquiring Xyratex, an industry leader in enterprise-data storage systems. “But we don’t just let the desire for revenue growth drive it,” says O’Malley. “Every acquisition has got to deliver TSR. We have turned away from some seemingly high-flying opportunities because of that.”

Of course, sustaining Seagate’s TSR performance into the future will require more than just financial policy. Seagate has also focused on the operational levers of TSR, both to create a more holistic approach to capital allocation and to inform its strategic decisions around pricing. And according to O’Malley, the next big step for Seagate will be to apply the TSR perspective to interactions with customers. “The big computer companies like Dell, HP, and Lenovo are all strategic customers of ours,” says O’Malley. “What economically is driving their decisions? We need to apply TSR to customer engagement as well. How do you drive a sales force that really sells value, that understands how our customers create value?” These moves are all part of a strategy of optimizing the company’s value-creation strategy for its new investor base.

The future will bring new challenges. Drive technology is evolving rapidly, requiring ever increasing investment. Competing technologies, such as solid-state storage, are expanding customer choice and further complicating buying decisions. And while cloud computing is likely to spur future growth, much of that demand is driven by fast-growing digital giants such as Google and Amazon. Such developments are putting renewed pressure on margins even as Seagate’s investment needs are growing.

But O’Malley is convinced that the company has a sustainable value model for the future. When Seagate’s stock lost 10 percent of its value in January 2014, of the 13 calls he received from investors, only 1 was negative. The company’s new GARP investors are in it for the long term; they understood that the decline had nothing to do with the company’s fundamental performance.

“If investors ask me whether we are going to make outsized gains in the future,” says O’Malley, “I tell them, ‘If you want outsized gains, you should sell the stock.’ I don’t promise outsized gains. I promise a consistent return model. If I do well relative to the market, then I’m happy.”

APPENDIX

THE 2014 VALUE CREATORS RANKINGS

The 2014 Value Creators rankings are based on an analysis of TSR at 1,620 global companies for the five-year period from 2009 through 2013.

To arrive at this sample, we began with TSR data for nearly 10,000 companies provided by Thomson Reuters. We eliminated all companies that were not listed on a world stock exchange for the full five years of our study or did not have at least 25 percent of their shares available on public capital markets. We further refined the sample by organizing the remaining companies into 26 industry groups and establishing an appropriate market-valuation hurdle to eliminate the smallest companies in each industry. (The size of the market-valuation hurdle for each industry can be found in the tables under “Industry Rankings.”) In addition to our 1,620-company comprehensive sample, we separated out 164 companies with market valuations of more than \$50 billion. We have included a table of rankings of these large-cap companies under “Global Rankings.”

The global and industry rankings are based on five-year TSR performance from 2009 through 2013.¹ We also show TSR performance for 2014, through February 26, 2014.

In addition, for all but two of the industry rankings, we break down TSR performance into the six investor-oriented financial metrics used in the BCG TSR model: sales growth, margin change, multiple change, dividend yield, change in the number of shares outstanding, and change in net debt. For two industries, banking and insurance, we use a slightly different approach to TSR disaggregation owing to the special analytical problems involved in measuring value creation in those sectors.

NOTE

1. TSR is a dynamic ratio that includes price gains and dividend payments for a specific stock during a given period. To measure performance from 2009 through 2013, 2008 end-of-year data must be used as a starting point in order to capture the change from 2008 to 2009, which determines 2009 TSR. For this reason, all exhibits in the report showing 2009-2013 performance begin with a 2008 data point.

GLOBAL RANKINGS

TOTAL GLOBAL SAMPLE

THE GLOBAL TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Industry | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Pharmacyclics | United States | Biopharma | 166.3 | 7.8 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 38 |
| 2 | GungHo Online Entertainment | Japan | Consumer durables | 138.5 | 8.3 | 71 | 45 | 25 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -14 |
| 3 | Galaxy Entertainment | Hong Kong | Travel and tourism | 130.9 | 37.9 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 13 |
| 4 | Jazz Pharmaceuticals | Ireland | Biopharma | 130.9 | 7.3 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 28 |
| 5 | Avis Budget | United States | Travel and tourism | 125.1 | 4.3 | 6 | 11 | 9 | 0 | -1 | 100 | 16 |
| 6 | Great Wall Motors | China | Automotive OEMs | 109.0 | 16.8 | 47 | 26 | 44 | 5 | -2 | -12 | -17 |
| 7 | Hexpol | Sweden | Chemicals | 101.3 | 2.6 | 20 | 8 | 42 | 7 | -5 | 29 | 18 |
| 8 | Sirius XM Radio | United States | Media and publishing | 96.9 | 21.4 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 2 |
| 9 | Plastic Omnium | France | Automotive components | 95.6 | 4.1 | 14 | 14 | 21 | 5 | 1 | 40 | 9 |
| 10 | Brilliance China Automotive | Hong Kong | Automotive OEMs | 94.6 | 8.2 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -6 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 1,620 global companies.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative or minimal EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

LARGE-CAP COMPANIES

THE LARGE-CAP TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Industry | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Priceline.com | United States | Travel and tourism | 73.6 | 59.8 | 29 | 21 | 27 | 0 | -4 | 1 | 17 |
| 2 | Las Vegas Sands | United States | Travel and tourism | 71.4 | 64.5 | 26 | 17 | 7 | 4 | -5 | 23 | 5 |
| 3 | Baidu | United States | Media and publishing | 68.6 | 62.2 | 62 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | -1 | -3 |
| 4 | Tencent | Hong Kong | Media and publishing | 58.7 | 117.6 | 57 | -9 | 12 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 25 |
| 5 | Tata Consultancy Services | India | Technology | 58.4 | 68.8 | 24 | 4 | 29 | 3 | 0 | -1 | 1 |
| 6 | Starbucks | United States | Retail | 54.4 | 59.1 | 8 | 11 | 31 | 2 | 0 | 3 | -8 |
| 7 | Amazon.com | United States | Retail | 50.7 | 182.5 | 31 | -1 | 24 | 0 | -1 | -2 | -10 |
| 8 | Ford Motor | United States | Automotive OEMs | 47.8 | 60.8 | 0 | 14 | 2 | 1 | -9 | 40 | 0 |
| 9 | Apple | United States | Technology | 46.7 | 500.7 | 40 | 13 | -1 | 1 | 0 | -7 | -7 |
| 10 | Volkswagen (preferred) | Germany | Automotive OEMs | 43.7 | 130.8 | 11 | 6 | 19 | 4 | -3 | 7 | -7 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 164 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$50 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

INDUSTRY RANKINGS

AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS

THE AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Plastic Omnium | France | 95.6 | 4.1 | 14 | 14 | 21 | 5 | 1 | 40 | 9 |
| 2 | Dana Holding | United States | 93.6 | 2.9 | -4 | 28 | 0 | 1 | -7 | 76 | 9 |
| 3 | TRW | United States | 83.2 | 8.6 | 3 | 7 | 27 | 0 | -3 | 48 | 10 |
| 4 | Tenneco | United States | 80.5 | 3.4 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 0 | -5 | 58 | 7 |
| 5 | Linamar | Canada | 66.7 | 2.7 | 9 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 0 | 18 | 4 |
| 6 | MRF | India | 58.3 | 1.3 | 19 | 13 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 17 | -2 |
| 7 | Dorman Products | United States | 54.8 | 2.0 | 14 | 17 | 22 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 |
| 8 | Xinyi Glass | Hong Kong | 54.6 | 3.5 | 25 | 3 | 19 | 9 | -3 | 1 | 0 |
| 9 | Valeo | France | 53.1 | 8.5 | 7 | 2 | 23 | 3 | -1 | 19 | 23 |
| 10 | Kenda Rubber Industrial | Taiwan | 50.0 | 1.7 | 8 | 19 | 9 | 4 | 0 | 11 | 11 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 69 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

AUTOMOTIVE OEMS

THE AUTOMOTIVE OEM Top Ten, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Great Wall Motors | China | 109.0 | 16.8 | 47 | 26 | 44 | 5 | -2 | -12 | -17 |
| 2 | Brilliance China Automotive | Hong Kong | 94.6 | 8.2 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -6 |
| 3 | Chongqing Changan Automobile | China | 72.9 | 9.2 | 23 | 7 | 33 | 2 | -2 | 10 | -3 |
| 4 | Fuji Heavy Industries | Japan | 68.3 | 22.4 | 10 | 31 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 25 | -7 |
| 5 | Tata Motors | India | 66.4 | 19.6 | 26 | 81 | -70 | 2 | -4 | 31 | 6 |
| 6 | Bajaj Auto | India | 61.6 | 8.9 | 20 | 10 | 22 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 1 |
| 7 | Hino Motors | Japan | 58.5 | 9.0 | 10 | 25 | -7 | 3 | 0 | 28 | -8 |
| 8 | Kia Motors | South Korea | 55.4 | 21.5 | 17 | 26 | -34 | 2 | -3 | 48 | -3 |
| 9 | Astra International | Indonesia | 49.5 | 22.6 | 15 | -3 | 29 | 4 | 0 | 4 | -4 |
| 10 | Mahindra & Mahindra | India | 49.3 | 9.0 | 23 | -2 | 17 | 2 | -2 | 10 | 2 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 38 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

BANKING

THE BANKING TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Equity growth (p.p.) | ROE change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Swedbank | Sweden | 44.3 | 30.9 | 7 | -3 | 36 | 12 | -8 | -1 |
| 2 | Sberbank | Russia | 38.4 | 67.5 | 20 | 10 | 6 | 2 | 0 | -13 |
| 3 | DNB | Norway | 36.8 | 29.1 | 12 | 1 | 22 | 5 | -4 | -2 |
| 4 | Natixis | France | 36.5 | 18.2 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 20 |
| 5 | National Bank of Abu Dhabi | United Arab Emirates | 31.7 | 16.1 | 21 | -13 | 19 | 4 | 0 | 12 |
| 6 | Grupo Financiero Banorte | Mexico | 30.9 | 19.4 | 22 | -8 | 22 | 1 | -6 | -10 |
| 7 | FirstRand | South Africa | 30.5 | 18.7 | 9 | 12 | -3 | 13 | -1 | -6 |
| 8 | Bank Rakyat Indonesia | Indonesia | 28.7 | 14.7 | 28 | 1 | -3 | 3 | 0 | 30 |
| 9 | Bank of China (Hong Kong) | Hong Kong | 28.6 | 33.9 | 12 | 34 | -23 | 5 | 0 | -5 |
| 10 | Siam Commercial Bank | Thailand | 28.3 | 14.9 | 18 | 4 | 8 | 4 | -6 | 3 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 81 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$15 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Equity growth and ROE change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had a negative P/E ratio in the start year.

BIOPHARMA

THE BIOPHARMA TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) | |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | | Net debt change (p.p.) |
| 1 | Pharmacyclics | United States | 166.3 | 7.8 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 38 | |
| 2 | Jazz Pharmaceuticals | Ireland | 130.9 | 7.3 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 28 | |
| 3 | Kalbe Farma | Indonesia | 76.2 | 4.8 | 15 | 1 | 58 | 3 | 0 | -1 | 12 |
| 4 | Regeneron Pharmaceuticals | United States | 71.9 | 26.8 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 22 | |
| 5 | Incyte | United States | 67.9 | 8.2 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 33 | |
| 6 | Valeant Pharmaceuticals | Canada | 64.2 | 39.2 | 46 | 1 | 39 | 3 | -14 | -11 | 30 |
| 7 | Salix Pharmaceuticals | United States | 59.1 | 5.7 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 20 | |
| 8 | Medivation | United States | 54.3 | 4.8 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | 33 | |
| 9 | Aspen Pharmacare | South Africa | 52.7 | 11.7 | 28 | 0 | 23 | 1 | -5 | 5 | 3 |
| 10 | Lupin | India | 50.2 | 6.6 | 24 | 4 | 20 | 1 | -2 | 4 | 6 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 66 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$4 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

BUILDING MATERIALS

THE BUILDING MATERIALS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Louisiana-Pacific | United States | 64.0 | 2.6 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 0 |
| 2 | Shree Cement | India | 57.7 | 2.4 | 15 | -5 | 36 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 8 |
| 3 | Stella-Jones | Canada | 47.9 | 1.8 | 21 | 2 | 20 | 2 | -6 | 10 | -4 |
| 4 | Norbord | Canada | 42.8 | 1.7 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -8 |
| 5 | Asian Paints | India | 42.1 | 7.6 | 18 | 5 | 16 | 2 | 0 | 1 | -3 |
| 6 | Indocement Tungal Prakarsa | Indonesia | 36.6 | 6.1 | 14 | 4 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 6 |
| 7 | UltraTech Cement | India | 36.5 | 7.8 | 27 | -6 | 27 | 1 | -15 | 2 | 4 |
| 8 | Siam Cement | Thailand | 35.9 | 14.7 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 9 | 4 |
| 9 | Eagle Materials | United States | 35.0 | 3.9 | 9 | 15 | 7 | 2 | -3 | 5 | 14 |
| 10 | Kingspan Group | Ireland | 34.4 | 3.0 | 2 | -6 | 30 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 11 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 59 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

CHEMICALS

THE CHEMICALS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Hexpol | Sweden | 101.3 | 2.6 | 20 | 8 | 42 | 7 | -5 | 29 | 18 |
| 2 | W.R. Grace | United States | 75.3 | 7.6 | -2 | 14 | 39 | 0 | -1 | 26 | 1 |
| 3 | Synthos | Poland | 73.4 | 2.4 | 14 | 0 | 46 | 8 | 0 | 6 | -5 |
| 4 | PolyOne | United States | 63.3 | 3.4 | 7 | 20 | 15 | 1 | -1 | 21 | 6 |
| 5 | Ashland | United States | 58.1 | 7.5 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -2 |
| 6 | Huntsman | United States | 54.0 | 5.9 | 2 | 11 | 7 | 6 | -1 | 29 | -2 |
| 7 | Westlake Chemical | United States | 52.5 | 8.2 | 0 | 36 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 9 |
| 8 | Arkema | France | 50.7 | 7.3 | 2 | 11 | 25 | 3 | -1 | 11 | -5 |
| 9 | Rockwood | United States | 47.6 | 5.3 | -6 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 0 | 32 | 10 |
| 10 | Eastman Chemical | United States | 42.3 | 12.4 | 7 | 18 | 11 | 4 | -1 | 5 | 6 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 116 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$2 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation for this company is not possible due to the impact of massive increases in debt.

COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS

THE COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | | |
| 1 | Sistema | Russia | 43.5 | 11.0 | 16 | -8 | 30 | 1 | 0 | 4 | -23 | |
| 2 | SoftBank | Japan | 42.9 | 103.9 | 20 | 3 | 13 | 1 | -2 | 8 | -14 | |
| 3 | Liberty Global | United Kingdom | 41.1 | 35.1 | 7 | 2 | 18 | 0 | -7 | 21 | -5 | |
| 4 | SBA Communications | United States | 40.7 | 11.5 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 0 | -2 | 9 | 3 | |
| 5 | Time Warner Cable | United States | 40.4 | 38.2 | 5 | -1 | 8 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 2 | |
| 6 | Crown Castle | United States | 33.1 | 24.1 | 15 | 1 | 10 | 0 | -3 | 10 | 0 | |
| 7 | Advanced Info Service | Thailand | 31.4 | 18.1 | 5 | 1 | 13 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 4 | |
| 8 | Etihad Etisalat | Saudi Arabia | 31.1 | 17.6 | 18 | 7 | -4 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 9 | |
| 9 | Telenor | Norway | 29.8 | 37.0 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 1 | 7 | -9 | |
| 10 | BT Group | United Kingdom | 27.4 | 49.4 | -3 | 13 | 2 | 5 | -1 | 12 | 9 | |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 55 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$8 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

CONSTRUCTION

THE CONSTRUCTION TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | | |
| 1 | Arteris | Brazil | 54.0 | 2.8 | 31 | -10 | 23 | 4 | 0 | 6 | -13 | |
| 2 | Pinfra | Mexico | 53.7 | 4.5 | 10 | 3 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 11 | |
| 3 | Chicago Bridge & Iron | Netherlands | 53.0 | 8.9 | 13 | 53 | -11 | 0 | -2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 4 | Graña y Montero | Peru | 45.2 | 2.8 | 27 | -5 | 19 | 2 | -3 | 6 | -9 | |
| 5 | NCC | Sweden | 41.8 | 3.5 | 0 | 4 | 22 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 5 | |
| 6 | China Camc Engineering | China | 39.8 | 2.1 | 37 | 15 | 16 | 2 | -5 | -25 | -10 | |
| 7 | Petrofac | Channel Islands | 37.5 | 6.9 | 14 | 5 | 21 | 5 | 0 | -8 | 10 | |
| 8 | Technip | France | 29.3 | 10.7 | 5 | 1 | 39 | 3 | -1 | -17 | 4 | |
| 9 | Obrascón Huarte Lain | Spain | 28.5 | 4.0 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 4 | -3 | 12 | 10 | |
| 10 | Ideal | Mexico | 26.2 | 6.8 | 4 | 28 | -6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 63 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1.75 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

CONSUMER DURABLES

THE CONSUMER DURABLES TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | GungHo Online Entertainment | Japan | 138.5 | 8.3 | 71 | 45 | 25 | 0 | 0 | -2 | -14 |
| 2 | Haier Electronics | Hong Kong | 84.9 | 7.5 | 44 | 18 | 31 | 0 | -5 | -3 | 0 |
| 3 | Techtronic Industries | Hong Kong | 72.2 | 5.2 | 4 | 8 | 33 | 2 | -4 | 28 | -9 |
| 4 | BesTV New Media | China | 65.0 | 6.8 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -8 |
| 5 | Brunswick | United States | 61.8 | 4.2 | -4 | 14 | 27 | 0 | -1 | 25 | -3 |
| 6 | Arçelik | Turkey | 57.2 | 3.8 | 10 | 2 | 12 | 14 | -10 | 28 | -4 |
| 7 | Middleby | United States | 54.5 | 4.6 | 17 | 0 | 33 | 0 | -2 | 6 | 25 |
| 8 | BSH | Turkey | 53.6 | 3.1 | 12 | -6 | 39 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 4 |
| 9 | Jarden | United States | 52.4 | 7.9 | 6 | 0 | 25 | 1 | -2 | 22 | -1 |
| 10 | Tempur Sealy | United States | 50.1 | 3.3 | 22 | -6 | 27 | 0 | 4 | 3 | -7 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 53 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$3 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

CONSUMER NONDURABLES

THE CONSUMER NONDURABLES TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Group | China | 58.4 | 13.2 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -15 |
| 2 | Green Mountain | United States | 54.4 | 11.3 | 55 | 22 | -19 | 0 | -6 | 3 | 54 |
| 3 | Estée Lauder | United States | 38.7 | 29.2 | 8 | 12 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 3 | -9 |
| 4 | Anheuser-Busch InBev | Belgium | 37.6 | 170.7 | 14 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 16 | -1 |
| 5 | Arca Continental | Mexico | 35.7 | 10.0 | 25 | -3 | 18 | 9 | -13 | 0 | -14 |
| 6 | Constellation Brands | United States | 34.9 | 13.3 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 16 |
| 7 | Tsingtao Brewery | China | 33.3 | 11.4 | 16 | -1 | 16 | 1 | -1 | 2 | -11 |
| 8 | ITC | India | 33.2 | 41.3 | 17 | 3 | 12 | 3 | -1 | 0 | 2 |
| 9 | Hengan International | China | 32.4 | 14.5 | 22 | 4 | 5 | 3 | -1 | 0 | -10 |
| 10 | Kerry | Ireland | 32.4 | 12.2 | 4 | 3 | 18 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 7 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 88 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$7.5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

FASHION AND LUXURY

THE FASHION AND LUXURY TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Shenzhou International | China | 91.0 | 5.3 | 19 | 7 | 52 | 8 | -2 | 8 | -8 |
| 2 | Sports Direct | United Kingdom | 77.0 | 7.5 | 15 | 3 | 39 | 1 | -2 | 22 | 12 |
| 3 | Lululemon Athletica | Canada | 71.6 | 8.6 | 35 | 7 | 30 | 0 | -1 | -1 | -11 |
| 4 | L Brands | United States | 56.5 | 18.0 | 4 | 12 | 22 | 13 | 2 | 5 | -6 |
| 5 | Signet Jewelers | Bermuda | 56.1 | 6.3 | 4 | 12 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 22 |
| 6 | LPP | Poland | 54.4 | 5.4 | 20 | 1 | 27 | 3 | -1 | 4 | 7 |
| 7 | Hugo Boss | Germany | 50.0 | 9.9 | 8 | 7 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 8 | -8 |
| 8 | Burberry | United Kingdom | 49.9 | 11.0 | 14 | 8 | 25 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 9 | Under Armour | United States | 48.9 | 9.2 | 26 | 0 | 25 | 0 | -1 | -1 | 33 |
| 10 | Fossil | United States | 48.3 | 6.6 | 16 | 5 | 28 | 0 | 4 | -4 | 0 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 40 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

FOREST PRODUCTS

THE FOREST PRODUCTS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Guangdong Guanbao High-Tech | China | 65.2 | 2.1 | 12 | 36 | 20 | 0 | -10 | 7 | -4 |
| 2 | Smurfit Kappa | Ireland | 59.8 | 5.6 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 2 | -1 | 42 | 11 |
| 3 | Graphic Packaging | United States | 53.1 | 3.1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 40 | 7 |
| 4 | BillerudKorsnäs | Sweden | 50.9 | 2.6 | 20 | 6 | 11 | 20 | -24 | 19 | 9 |
| 5 | DS Smith | United Kingdom | 50.4 | 5.1 | 15 | 10 | 11 | 16 | -16 | 15 | 3 |
| 6 | Lee & Man Paper Manufacturing | Hong Kong | 43.4 | 3.1 | 14 | -1 | 15 | 3 | -1 | 13 | -7 |
| 7 | Mondi | United Kingdom | 43.3 | 8.4 | -2 | 6 | 17 | 5 | 0 | 17 | 0 |
| 8 | Packaging Company of America | United States | 40.5 | 6.2 | 9 | 3 | 17 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 14 |
| 9 | Huhtamäki | Finland | 39.8 | 2.7 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 6 | -1 | 14 | 12 |
| 10 | International Paper | United States | 37.0 | 21.8 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 4 | -1 | 20 | 5 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 40 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

HEALTH CARE SERVICES

THE HEALTH CARE SERVICES TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Ship Healthcare | Japan | 64.4 | 7.0 | 16 | 5 | 16 | 5 | -4 | 27 | -10 |
| 2 | Air Methods | United States | 63.4 | 2.3 | 12 | 24 | 23 | 2 | -2 | 4 | -10 |
| 3 | Tenet Healthcare | United States | 55.7 | 4.2 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 30 | 5 |
| 4 | OdontoPrev | Brazil | 49.2 | 2.2 | 25 | -2 | 34 | 11 | -11 | -7 | -10 |
| 5 | KPJ Healthcare | Malaysia | 48.9 | 1.2 | 13 | -6 | 34 | 7 | -4 | 5 | -15 |
| 6 | Health Management Associates | United States | 48.9 | 3.5 | 11 | -7 | 14 | 0 | -2 | 32 | n/a |
| 7 | Bangkok Dusit Medical Services | Thailand | 48.6 | 5.6 | 18 | -2 | 28 | 3 | -5 | 6 | 7 |
| 8 | Ryman Healthcare | New Zealand | 45.4 | 3.2 | 18 | 34 | -13 | 4 | 0 | 3 | -2 |
| 9 | WellCare Health Plans | United States | 40.5 | 3.1 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -16 |
| 10 | Cigna | United States | 39.2 | 24.2 | 11 | 21 | -1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | -11 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 43 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

INSURANCE

THE INSURANCE TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Equity growth (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Old Mutual | United Kingdom | 31.1 | 14.4 | -1 | 26 | 6 | 0 | -1 |
| 2 | Prudential | United Kingdom | 31.0 | 56.6 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | Legal & General | United Kingdom | 29.9 | 21.7 | 9 | 15 | 6 | 0 | 8 |
| 4 | Sampo | Finland | 28.9 | 27.5 | 18 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 2 |
| 5 | Prudential Financial | United States | 28.0 | 42.7 | 21 | 5 | 3 | -2 | -8 |
| 6 | Hannover Rück | Germany | 27.6 | 10.4 | 15 | 7 | 5 | 0 | -1 |
| 7 | PICC Property and Casualty | China | 26.6 | 20.2 | 24 | 2 | 4 | -4 | -8 |
| 8 | Lincoln National | United States | 23.5 | 13.5 | 11 | 12 | 1 | 0 | -3 |
| 9 | Principal Financial | United States | 19.8 | 14.5 | 31 | -12 | 3 | -3 | -10 |
| 10 | Standard Life | United Kingdom | 19.7 | 14.2 | 4 | 10 | 7 | -2 | 7 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 42 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$10 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Equity growth data for 2013 is based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in price-to-book (P/B) multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

MACHINERY

THE MACHINERY TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | B/E Aerospace | United States | 62.5 | 9.1 | 11 | 2 | 37 | 0 | -1 | 14 | -4 |
| 2 | Weir Group | United Kingdom | 50.4 | 7.5 | 13 | 8 | 24 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 18 |
| 3 | Travis Perkins | United Kingdom | 49.4 | 7.5 | 10 | -5 | 22 | 9 | -13 | 28 | 3 |
| 4 | TransDigm Group | United States | 48.4 | 8.5 | 23 | -1 | 15 | 12 | -2 | 1 | 10 |
| 5 | IMI | United Kingdom | 46.4 | 6.8 | 3 | 7 | 25 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 14 |
| 6 | Safran | France | 42.6 | 29.0 | 7 | 7 | 20 | 3 | -1 | 6 | -2 |
| 7 | Cummins | United States | 41.7 | 26.2 | 4 | 7 | 23 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| 8 | Zodiac Aerospace | France | 41.1 | 9.7 | 14 | 4 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 1 |
| 9 | Weichai Power | China | 40.2 | 8.1 | 14 | 1 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 2 | -6 |
| 10 | Kone | Finland | 38.9 | 23.2 | 9 | 2 | 21 | 6 | 0 | 2 | -7 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 69 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$7 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

MEDIA AND PUBLISHING

THE MEDIA AND PUBLISHING TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Sirius XM Radio | United States | 96.9 | 21.4 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 2 |
| 2 | ProSiebenSat.1 Media | Germany | 83.3 | 10.6 | -3 | 8 | 22 | 11 | 0 | 45 | -7 |
| 3 | Rightmove | United Kingdom | 76.1 | 4.4 | 13 | 7 | 49 | 3 | 2 | 2 | -5 |
| 4 | Baidu | China | 68.6 | 62.2 | 62 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | -1 | -3 |
| 5 | Tencent | China | 58.7 | 117.6 | 57 | -9 | 12 | 1 | -1 | -1 | 25 |
| 6 | CBS | United States | 53.1 | 38.2 | 2 | 5 | 26 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 3 |
| 7 | Rackspace | United States | 48.7 | 5.5 | 24 | 6 | 20 | 0 | -3 | 3 | -6 |
| 8 | Naspers | South Africa | 46.8 | 41.4 | 19 | -14 | 41 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 17 |
| 9 | Schibsted | Norway | 46.2 | 7.1 | 2 | -2 | 30 | 9 | -10 | 17 | -2 |
| 10 | Dish Network | United States | 45.0 | 26.5 | 4 | -5 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 11 | -1 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 59 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$4 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

THE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Hartalega | Malaysia | 72.7 | 1.6 | 22 | 5 | 38 | 5 | -1 | 2 | -3 |
| 2 | GN Store Nord | Denmark | 67.6 | 4.1 | 4 | 27 | 21 | 0 | 4 | 11 | 1 |
| 3 | Dexcom | United States | 66.6 | 2.5 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 28 |
| 4 | Sartorius Stedim Biotech | France | 59.0 | 2.6 | 10 | 12 | 22 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 20 |
| 5 | The Cooper Companies | United States | 50.0 | 5.9 | 8 | 8 | 19 | 0 | -1 | 16 | 5 |
| 6 | Sirona Dental Systems | United States | 46.2 | 3.9 | 8 | 2 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 13 | -2 |
| 7 | Align Technology | United States | 45.5 | 4.6 | 17 | 21 | 15 | 0 | -4 | -3 | -7 |
| 8 | Elekta | Sweden | 40.7 | 5.8 | 11 | 6 | 21 | 2 | -1 | 0 | -10 |
| 9 | Coloplast | Denmark | 40.0 | 13.9 | 7 | 13 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 26 |
| 10 | Bruker | United States | 37.4 | 3.3 | 11 | -2 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 15 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 63 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1.5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

METALS

THE METALS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|--|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Hi-Tech | China | 57.4 | 8.9 | 21 | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 4 | -7 |
| 2 | Hyundai Hysco | South Korea | 41.9 | 3.2 | 9 | 7 | -4 | 1 | 0 | 29 | 470 |
| 3 | JSW Steel | India | 36.1 | 4.0 | 25 | -4 | 0 | 1 | -5 | 18 | -16 |
| 4 | Korea Zinc | South Korea | 35.5 | 5.3 | 10 | -7 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 5 | Reliance Steel & Aluminum | United States | 32.3 | 5.9 | 1 | -6 | 26 | 2 | -1 | 10 | -9 |
| 6 | Severstal | Russia | 31.2 | 8.0 | -10 | -7 | 25 | 2 | 4 | 16 | -17 |
| 7 | Hitachi Metals | Japan | 31.1 | 6.0 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 2 | -4 | 14 | 4 |
| 8 | Dowa | Japan | 28.4 | 2.9 | 5 | 33 | -24 | 2 | 0 | 13 | -18 |
| 9 | Carpenter Technology | United States | 27.3 | 3.3 | 10 | 16 | 3 | 3 | -4 | -1 | -6 |
| 10 | Xiamen Tungsten | China | 26.4 | 2.7 | 15 | 9 | -3 | 1 | 0 | 5 | -15 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 50 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$2.5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

MINING

THE MINING TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | KGHM | Poland | 49.3 | 7.8 | 13 | -3 | 28 | 16 | 0 | -4 | -3 |
| 2 | Boliden | Sweden | 45.6 | 4.2 | 2 | 12 | 14 | 5 | 0 | 13 | 3 |
| 3 | Grupo México | Mexico | 41.6 | 25.7 | 8 | -2 | 31 | 3 | 0 | 0 | -4 |
| 4 | First Quantum Minerals | Canada | 41.3 | 10.6 | 12 | -2 | 40 | 1 | -10 | 1 | 12 |
| 5 | Teck Resources | Canada | 38.1 | 15.0 | 6 | -3 | 5 | 2 | -3 | 31 | -11 |
| 6 | Assore | South Africa | 31.8 | 4.5 | 11 | -5 | 28 | 3 | -3 | -2 | 26 |
| 7 | Fresnillo | Mexico | 29.9 | 9.1 | 16 | 1 | 11 | 3 | -1 | -1 | 28 |
| 8 | Freeport-McMoRan | United States | 29.3 | 39.2 | 3 | 0 | 20 | 4 | -6 | 7 | -11 |
| 9 | Inner Mongolia Yitai Coal | China | 27.0 | 5.8 | 22 | -9 | 0 | 4 | 12 | -2 | -36 |
| 10 | Fortescue Metals | Australia | 26.0 | 16.2 | 44 | 14 | -32 | 1 | 0 | -2 | -4 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 47 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$4 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

MULTIBUSINESS

THE MULTIBUSINESS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Alfa | Mexico | 68.9 | 14.4 | 12 | 4 | 24 | 3 | 2 | 24 | -13 |
| 2 | Aboitiz Equity Ventures | Philippines | 63.7 | 6.8 | 27 | 21 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| 3 | Brookfield Infrastructure Partners | Canada | 35.9 | 5.9 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -6 |
| 4 | IHI | Japan | 33.8 | 6.3 | -1 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 18 | 4 |
| 5 | Tyco International | Switzerland | 33.7 | 19.1 | -12 | -3 | 24 | 20 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 6 | Carlisle | United States | 33.1 | 5.1 | 0 | 8 | 18 | 2 | -1 | 6 | -1 |
| 7 | Rockwell Automation | United States | 32.9 | 16.4 | 3 | 0 | 24 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 8 | Imperial | South Africa | 32.6 | 3.8 | 14 | 5 | 7 | 5 | -1 | 3 | -21 |
| 9 | Keppel | Singapore | 30.0 | 16.0 | 1 | 5 | 17 | 7 | -1 | 1 | -7 |
| 10 | Eaton | Ireland | 29.0 | 36.1 | 7 | 4 | 16 | 4 | -7 | 5 | -1 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 55 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$4 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company reported no EBITDA in the start year of the analysis.

OIL

THE OIL TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Bashneft | Russia | 85.7 | 11.1 | 33 | 2 | 61 | 14 | -2 | -23 | 0 |
| 2 | MarkWest Energy Partners | United States | 65.0 | 10.3 | 10 | -6 | 45 | 12 | -18 | 22 | 6 |
| 3 | Pioneer Natural Resources | United States | 62.9 | 27.1 | 9 | 4 | 35 | 0 | -5 | 19 | 4 |
| 4 | Novatek | Russia | 50.4 | 36.5 | 29 | -3 | 22 | 2 | 0 | 0 | -6 |
| 5 | Seadrill | Bermuda | 50.0 | 19.3 | 20 | 11 | -2 | 10 | -3 | 16 | -13 |
| 6 | Oil and Gas Development | Pakistan | 47.7 | 11.3 | 20 | -3 | 24 | 7 | 0 | 0 | -6 |
| 7 | HollyFrontier | United States | 47.5 | 9.9 | 27 | 17 | -3 | 7 | -13 | 13 | -5 |
| 8 | Energy Transfer Equity | United States | 46.9 | 22.9 | 39 | -19 | 16 | 9 | -5 | 7 | 9 |
| 9 | Kunlun Energy | Hong Kong | 44.1 | 14.2 | 52 | -6 | 17 | 3 | -11 | -10 | 0 |
| 10 | Williams Partners | United States | 43.7 | 22.3 | 60 | 2 | -6 | 10 | -35 | 12 | 0 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 80 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$9 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

POWER AND GAS UTILITIES

THE POWER AND GAS UTILITIES TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | ENN Energy | China | 49.6 | 8.0 | 25 | 4 | 13 | 2 | -1 | 8 | -4 |
| 2 | Manila Electric | Philippines | 37.5 | 6.4 | 9 | 18 | -5 | 4 | 0 | 12 | 15 |
| 3 | NiSource | United States | 30.9 | 10.3 | -9 | 11 | 10 | 6 | -3 | 15 | 7 |
| 4 | CMS Energy | United States | 26.5 | 7.1 | -1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | -3 | 16 | 7 |
| 5 | Perusahaan Gas Negara | Indonesia | 23.1 | 8.9 | 22 | -7 | 0 | 4 | -1 | 5 | 9 |
| 6 | Calpine | United States | 21.8 | 8.5 | -8 | 8 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 12 | -2 |
| 7 | Tenaga Nasional | Malaysia | 20.6 | 19.6 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 3 | -1 | 5 | 5 |
| 8 | Sempra Energy | United States | 20.0 | 21.9 | -1 | 11 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| 9 | Hong Kong and China Gas | Hong Kong | 19.8 | 21.9 | 17 | -2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | -2 | -5 |
| 10 | DTE Energy | United States | 18.8 | 11.7 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 6 | -2 | 9 | 8 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 64 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$7 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

RETAIL

THE RETAIL TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Magnit | Russia | 72.2 | 6.3 | 28 | 10 | 28 | 1 | -3 | 7 | -16 |
| 2 | Whole Foods | United States | 66.5 | 21.5 | 10 | 8 | 40 | 1 | -5 | 12 | -8 |
| 3 | Netflix | United States | 65.2 | 21.8 | 26 | -14 | 55 | 0 | 0 | -3 | 22 |
| 4 | Ulta Salon | United States | 63.8 | 6.2 | 20 | 15 | 26 | 0 | -2 | 5 | -7 |
| 5 | Tractor Supply | United States | 54.7 | 10.8 | 11 | 14 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | -9 |
| 6 | Starbucks | United States | 54.4 | 59.1 | 8 | 11 | 31 | 2 | 0 | 3 | -8 |
| 7 | Chipotle | United States | 53.8 | 16.5 | 19 | 9 | 26 | 0 | 1 | -1 | 4 |
| 8 | CP ALL | Thailand | 51.2 | 11.5 | 17 | 8 | 34 | 4 | 0 | -12 | -10 |
| 9 | Amazon.com | United States | 50.7 | 182.5 | 31 | -1 | 24 | 0 | -1 | -2 | -10 |
| 10 | CarMax | United States | 42.9 | 10.5 | 13 | 32 | 5 | 0 | 0 | -7 | 3 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 68 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$8 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

TECHNOLOGY

THE TECHNOLOGY TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | GoerTek | China | 74.7 | 8.8 | 58 | -3 | 23 | 1 | -3 | -1 | -24 |
| 2 | Seagate Technology | Ireland | 70.3 | 18.3 | 7 | 23 | 20 | 4 | 9 | 8 | -7 |
| 3 | ARM | United Kingdom | 67.8 | 25.5 | 19 | 10 | 40 | 2 | -2 | -1 | -10 |
| 4 | HCL | India | 64.4 | 16.2 | 26 | 5 | 27 | 3 | -1 | 4 | 25 |
| 5 | Infinion Technologies | Germany | 59.2 | 11.5 | -2 | 6 | 32 | 7 | -7 | 23 | 6 |
| 6 | Tata Consultancy Services | India | 58.4 | 68.8 | 24 | 4 | 29 | 3 | 0 | -1 | 1 |
| 7 | Catamaran | United States | 54.7 | 9.8 | 70 | -1 | 1 | 0 | -14 | -2 | 14 |
| 8 | Micron Technology | United States | 52.5 | 23.0 | 14 | 15 | 8 | 0 | -6 | 23 | 11 |
| 9 | Western Digital | United States | 49.8 | 19.8 | 15 | 9 | 37 | 1 | -1 | -11 | 5 |
| 10 | SanDisk | United States | 49.2 | 15.9 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 9 |

Sources: Sources: Standard & Poor's Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 80 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$9 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company had negative EBITDA in either the start year or the end year of the analysis.

TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS

THE TRANSPORTATION AND LOGISTICS TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Macquarie Infrastructure | United States | 74.9 | 3.0 | 0 | -5 | 27 | 4 | -4 | 53 | 3 |
| 2 | International Container Terminal Services | Philippines | 53.8 | 4.7 | 13 | 1 | 33 | 2 | -1 | 6 | -1 |
| 3 | TransForce | Canada | 49.2 | 2.2 | 7 | -2 | 20 | 6 | -1 | 19 | -9 |
| 4 | Kansas City Southern | United States | 46.0 | 13.6 | 5 | 6 | 24 | 1 | -4 | 14 | -26 |
| 5 | Jasa Marga | Indonesia | 42.8 | 2.6 | 25 | -12 | 24 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| 6 | Hyundai Glovis | South Korea | 38.5 | 8.2 | 29 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 0 | -4 | -1 |
| 7 | Qube | Australia | 36.7 | 1.7 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 3 |
| 8 | Westshore Terminals | Canada | 36.1 | 2.4 | 2 | -2 | 31 | 7 | 0 | -2 | 7 |
| 9 | Canadian Pacific Railway | Canada | 33.7 | 26.5 | 4 | 4 | 15 | 2 | -3 | 10 | 7 |
| 10 | Old Dominion | United States | 33.2 | 4.6 | 9 | 8 | 14 | 0 | -1 | 3 | 1 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 94 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$1.5 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company reported no EBITDA in the start year of the analysis.

TRAVEL AND TOURISM

THE TRAVEL AND TOURISM TOP TEN, 2009-2013

| | Company | Location ² | Average annual TSR (%) | Market value ³ (\$billions) | TSR Disaggregation ¹ | | | | | | 2014 TSR ⁶ (%) |
|----|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | | Sales growth (p.p.) | Margin change (p.p.) | Multiple change ⁴ (p.p.) | Dividend yield (p.p.) | Share change ⁵ (p.p.) | Net debt change (p.p.) | |
| 1 | Galaxy Entertainment | Hong Kong | 130.9 | 37.9 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | 13 |
| 2 | Avis Budget | United States | 125.1 | 4.3 | 6 | 11 | 9 | 0 | -1 | 100 | 16 |
| 3 | SJM | Hong Kong | 78.5 | 18.6 | 38 | 4 | 27 | 6 | -2 | 6 | -4 |
| 4 | Priceline.com | United States | 73.6 | 59.8 | 29 | 21 | 27 | 0 | -4 | 1 | 17 |
| 5 | Las Vegas Sands | United States | 71.4 | 64.5 | 26 | 17 | 7 | 4 | -5 | 23 | 5 |
| 6 | Wyndham Hotels and Resorts | United States | 65.4 | 9.6 | 3 | 3 | 27 | 3 | 6 | 23 | -2 |
| 7 | Melco International Development | Hong Kong | 62.0 | 5.6 | n/a ⁷ | | | | | | -3 |
| 8 | Turkish Airlines | Turkey | 57.4 | 4.1 | 25 | -4 | 30 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 2 |
| 9 | Airports of Thailand | Thailand | 57.1 | 6.9 | 11 | 2 | 20 | 3 | 0 | 21 | 16 |
| 10 | Expedia | United States | 56.4 | 9.1 | 10 | -11 | 26 | 23 | 2 | 5 | 13 |

Sources: S&P Capital IQ; Thomson Reuters Datastream; Bloomberg; annual reports; BCG analysis.

Note: n = 68 global companies with a market valuation greater than \$3 billion as of November 30, 2013.

¹Contribution of each factor shown in percentage points of five-year average annual TSR. Sales growth and margin change data for 2013 are based on analyst consensus estimates or latest available data. Any apparent discrepancies in TSR totals are due to rounding.

²Location refers to the location of the primary stock exchange on which the company's shares are listed.

³As of December 31, 2013.

⁴Change in EBITDA multiple.

⁵Share change refers to the change in the number of shares outstanding, not to the change in share price.

⁶As of February 26, 2014.

⁷Meaningful TSR disaggregation is not possible because this company reported no or minimal EBITDA in the start year of the analysis.

FOR FURTHER READING

The Boston Consulting Group publishes many reports and articles on corporate development and value creation that may be of interest to senior executives. Examples include:

Invest Wisely, Divest Strategically: Tapping the Power of Diversity to Raise Valuations

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group and HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, April 2014

Growth for the Rest of Us

BCG Perspectives, January 2014

Using Operational Excellence to Boost Shareholder Returns

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group, November 2013

Unlocking New Sources of Value Creation

The 2013 Value Creators Report, September 2013

BRICs Versus Mortar? Winning at M&A in Emerging Markets

A report by The Boston Consulting Group, August 2013

Designing the Corporate Center: How to Turn Strategy into Structure

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group, May 2013

The Art of Risk Management

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group, April 2013

Divide and Conquer: How Successful M&A Deals Split the Synergies

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group and the Technische Universität München, March 2013

Much Ado About Not Much: Why Tax Policy Changes Should Not Affect Dividend and Share Repurchase Plans

An article by The Boston Consulting Group, December 2012

Corporate Venture Capital: Avoid the Risks, Miss the Rewards

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group, October 2012

Improving the Odds: Strategies for Superior Value Creation

The 2012 Value Creators Report, September 2012

Plant and Prune: How M&A Can Grow Portfolio Value

A report by The Boston Consulting Group, August 2012

Enabling PMI: Building Capabilities for Effective Integration

A Focus by The Boston Consulting Group, July 2012

How Value Patterns Work

BCG Perspectives, June 2012

Value Patterns: The Concept

BCG Perspectives, May 2012

The CEO as Investor

BCG Perspectives, March 2012

First, Do No Harm: How to Be a Good Corporate Parent

A report by The Boston Consulting Group, March 2012

The Power of Diversified Companies During Crises

A report by The Boston Consulting Group and HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, January 2012

NOTE TO THE READER

About the Authors

Gerry Hansell is a senior partner and managing director in the Chicago office of The Boston Consulting Group and a BCG Fellow.

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Acknowledgments

This report is a product of BCG's Corporate Development practice. The authors would like to thank their BCG colleagues Jesús de Juan, a senior partner and managing director in the Monterrey office; Sebastian DiGrande, a senior partner and managing director in the San Francisco office; Danny Friedman, a senior partner and managing director in the Los Angeles office and leader of the Corporate Development practice in North America; Nicholas Glenning, a senior partner and managing director in the Melbourne office and the leader of the Corporate Development practice in the Asia-Pacific region; Jérôme Hervé, a senior partner and managing director in the Paris office and leader of the Corporate Development practice in Western Europe and South America; Jens Kengelbach, a partner and managing director in the Munich office and global head of marketing for the Corporate Development practice; Eduardo León, a partner and managing

director in the Monterrey office; Alexander Roos, a senior partner and managing director in the Berlin office and global leader of the Corporate Development practice; and John Rose, a senior partner and managing director in the New York office.

Finally, the authors would like to thank Robert Howard for his contributions to the conceptualization and writing of this report; Philippe Dehillotte, Kerstin Hobelsberger, Martin Link, and Dirk Schilder of the Value Creators research team for their contributions to the research; and Katherine Andrews, Gary Callahan, Angela DiBattista, Kim Friedman, Gina Goldstein, Abby Garland, and Sara Strassenreiter for contributions to editing, design, and production.

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